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For many years, Henry Stapp and I have been working separately and indepen-
dently on mind-centered interpretations of quantum theory. In this review, I discuss
his work and contrast it with my own. There is much that we agree on, both in the
broad problems we have addressed and in some of the specific details of our analyses
of neural physics, but ultimately we disagree fundamently in our views on mind, mat-
ter, and quantum mechanics. In particular, I discuss our contrasting opinions about
the nature and randomness of quantum events, about relativity theory, and about the
many-minds idea. I also suggest that Stapp’s theories are inadequately developed.
The theoretical analysis of the idea that there might be a link between quantum
mechanics and consciousness begins with the famous book by von Neumann (1932).
von Neumann proposed a mathematical formalism according to which there were two
distinct ways in which a quantum system could change with time. On the one hand,
there were abrupt indeterministic “quantum events” due to “measurement”, in which,
with appropriate probability, one of the possible results of the measurement appears.
On the other hand, for isolated and unmeasured systems, there was just the continuous
deterministic change described by the Schro¨dinger equation. This proposed duality in
dynamics immediately raises the question of what distinguishes “measurements” from
other physical processes. von Neumann argued that measurement involved a chain
of physical processes in which the physical system to be measured interacts with a
physical measuring device, which ultimately interacts with light, which in turn inter-
acts with the eye of an observer. Eventually information is carried to the brain of the
observer. This suggests the possibility that it is only when that information becomes
conscious that something has occurred which can make “measurement” different in
kind from any other physical process.
Stapp and I have both attempted to investigate this possibility by proposing
theoretical analyses to make sense of our conscious observations of the world in the
light of the evidence for quantum theory. We have both tried to understand the
duality of quantum events and the Schro¨dinger equation. We both agree that brain
processes are fundamentally decoherent and that brain states should be analysed as
mixtures of essentially classical states (Donald 1990, 1992, Stapp 2000a, 2000b). We
have both noted the extent to which brains are unstable and unpredictable dynamical
systems (Donald 1990, 2002, Stapp 1993 chapter 6, 1999 Appendix A). Both of us
argue that neural uncertainties are ultimately “quantum” in origin. This leads both
of us to stress the multiplicity of quantum events which must be “decided”, or of
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“choices” or “measurements” which must be “made”, at every moment in normal
brain functioning.
Beyond these basic agreements, there are however very significant differences in
our proposals. According to my analysis, the abrupt indeterministic quantum events
are not physical occurences in a conventional observer-independent sense. They cor-
respond rather to the steps in the development of the mental structures of individual
observers. My aim has been to provide an explicit abstract characterization of the
structure of an observer and to argue that human beings can be described as pos-
sessing such structures. These structures are based on the idea of a temporal pattern
of elementary abstract quantum events which I call “switchings” (“determinations”
in Donald 1999). I propose that there are no other quantum events. Thus, in my
proposal, the problem of the characterization of consciousness and the problem of the
interpretation of quantum theory are both solved together. Stapp (1993, §6.7.4), by
contrast, proposes that quantum events are physical and occur in inanimate objects
as well as in the brains of observers. This means that he encumbers himself with the
necessity of providing a characterization of the inanimate occurences of the events
if he is to complete his interpretation. Were he to succeed in doing this, he would
already have managed to solve what is often seen as the central problem in the in-
terpretation of quantum theory, and his comments on consciousness would seem to
many (although not to me) to be extraneous.
Stapp and I also disagree at a fundamental level about the randomness of quan-
tum events. In Stapp (1993, §7.6), for example, he writes that, “it is an absurdity to
believe that the quantum choices can appear simply randomly ‘out of the blue’, on the
basis of absolutely nothing at all.” Presumably because he believes that reality is not
absurd, Stapp uses this first claim to argue that consciousness intervenes in quantum
events to influence outcomes. This second claim is bold, but in Stapp (2001a), he
moves toward the even bolder third claim, which he attributes to both Copenhagen
and von Neumann quantum theory, that “the choice of which question will be put to
nature, is not controlled by any rules that are known or understood within contempo-
rary physics”. Again, in Stapp (2000b), he writes “there is one element that [is] not
governed by any known law of physics, namely the choices to consent or not consent
at time t to putting to nature the question associated with the possible experience
E(t)”.
As far as the first claim is concerned, it is hard to avoid the idea that in physics
ultimately everything just does appear “out of the blue”. In classical mechanics, for
example, physics does not explain the initial conditions, but merely provides the laws
by which those initial conditions develop. One of the attractions of a many-minds
approach, in my opinion, is that it allows us to avoid the “absurdity” of requiring the
entire observed future to be encoded into the initial state of the universe. Instead, as I
discuss in section 9 of Donald (1999), it is possible to suppose that the initial state of
the universe is a simple state – perhaps even a vacuum state in the ultimate theory of
everything – and to suppose that all the remaining information which constructs our
apparent individual reality is individually-observed information. This information is
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determined in our personal observations of the genuinely-random, “out of the blue”,
outcomes of the quantum events which make up our mental structures.
Stapp’s second and third claims would seem to suppose that consciousness is an
extra-physical actor; directing physical dynamics by making choices. I find Stapp’s
position on this issue rather confusing. In section 6.7.2 of Stapp (1993), he rejects
the somewhat similiar proposals of Eccles (1986) as being explicitly dualistic and
introducing a “homunculus”. The proposals of Walker (2000) are also similar, and
I have criticized them on the same grounds in Donald (2001b). So Stapp and I
apparently agree that it is essential to avoid the idea of a little man inside the brain
directing the brain’s thinking. However the lesson of modern neurophysiology seems
to me to be that everything we experience is directly reflected in the functioning
and structure of our nervous system. Here “everything we experience” includes not
only our thoughts and feelings, but also our thoughts about our thoughts. According
to this neurophysiological hypothesis, every human thought and action, including
choices, decisions, and self-analysis, can be explained in terms of the functioning of
the evolved physical brain. One day, I choose to take dessert because the firing from
my appetite centers dominates the firing from my prefrontal cortex and I say, “I’ll have
the chocolate mousse, please”, rather than, “Nothing for me, thank you”. Another
day, I will myself to abstain, because I have been sufficiently disturbed by not being
able to get my old trousers to fasten, that thoughts of consequences outweigh thoughts
of pleasure. The ability of a brain to talk about and apparently to decide its own
behaviour is not paradoxical, because it is limited, and because of the parallel and
modular structure of neural processing. It is easy to understand why such an ability
should have evolved because it allows efficient analysis, planning, and communication.
Stapp and I seem to agree that the evolved physical brain, as studied by neu-
rophysiologists, is not a deterministic machine. Stapp proposes that aspects of the
random events which affect the path of the machine can be chosen. Yet, in Stapp
(2000b), he writes, “I do not intend to speculate at this point about how the eval-
uation that lies behind this choice is carried out. At the present early stage in the
development of the science of the mind-brain system that question remains a project
for future research.” If he is not simply invoking an extra-physical homunculus at this
point, however then at least we can ask whether choices are supposed to be made us-
ing conventional neural circuitry – in which case, it is certainly not clear to me where
the requisite circuitry is supposed to be – or whether some other type of physical
process is supposed to be involved.
The events which initiate randomness in the brain include quantum spreading in
the paths of calcium ions (Stapp 1999). Clearly there is no neural circuitry which is
capable of analysing those paths directly. Instead, Stapp’s suggestion, at least in his
earlier papers, seems to be that the brain state becomes a superposition or mixture of
different developing possibilities until consciousness is reached, a choice occurs, and
the possibilities are reduced to a single outcome. The trouble with this idea is that
the state becomes a mixture of different neural firing patterns rather than a neural
firing pattern analysing a mixture. The self-analysis of a such a mixture would require
not just an entirely new type of neurophysiology, but an entirely new type of physics.
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example Suppose, as a result of quantum spreading, that in one branch of the
total quantum state of a brain the initiation of a single neural firing is delayed,
compared to another branch, by a mere 10−5s relative to some other neural firing.
Because of the metastability of neural firing, even a delay as short as this, on the
millisecond firing timescale, could be long enough to trigger radical changes in the
ultimate outcome of the developing neural response. Yet 10−5s is macroscopic on
the picosecond timescale of molecular vibrations in the warm wet brain. This means
that just this initial difference is sufficient to make these branches of the total state
almost instantly become mutually decoherent. They can then be assigned their own
separate density-matrix quantum states, which we shall denote by ρ1 and ρ2. So, in
this situation, the relevant part of the total state, by the time the firing patterns have
developed sufficiently for a choice between the outcomes to be possible in conventional
terms, will be a mixture of approximate form ρ = p1ρ1 + p2ρ2 where p1 and p2 are
the conventional probabilities of the two possibilities. The notation here supresses
important dependencies. In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, which is sufficient
for our present purposes, ρ depends on time and on a choice of the space of operators
considered relevant to the situation, while in relativistic quantum field theory the
time will itself be specified by the space of operators. However, at any time on
the conventionally-recognised timescale of conscious processing and for any space
of operators localized within the brain of the individual considered, ρ will have a
decoherent decomposition of the suggested form. It follows that no conventional
physical process within the brain will be able to cause a (generalized) “collapse” from
ρ to either ρ1 or ρ2. Because of decoherence, ρ1 and ρ2 have become dynamically
independent. The splitting into decoherent states is a locally irreversible process due
to the dissipation of information.
In his earlier papers (1982, 1993 chapter 6, 1995), Stapp seems to suggest that
somehow the structure of ρ, or possibly of ρ1 or ρ2, directs the collapse. How this is
supposed to work is not explained. In his later papers (1999, 2000a, 2001a), Stapp
suggests the quantum Zeno process as the mechanism. This suggestion has been
picked up by Jeffrey M. Schwartz (Schwartz and Begley 2002). In his treatment of
obsessive-compulsive disorder patients, Schwartz appeals to Stapp’s work, along with
the Buddhist concept of mindfulness, to argue for the reality of free will. Nothing I say
here should be taken as a criticism of Schwartz’s plausible and apparently-successful
treatment, which involves patients learning to challenge their intrusive thoughts. Nor
do I criticize the wealth of interesting evidence reviewed by Schwartz and Begley about
the possibility, throughout life, of quite large-scale changes in neural connectivity.
This evidence allows them to justify a strong form of the conclusion that, “it is the
life we lead that creates the brain we have”. I only disagree with the framework which
Schwartz uses to explain the meaning of challenging one’s own thoughts.
Johnjoe McFadden (2000) has independently invoked the quantum Zeno effect
in an attempt to solve problems in biological science. In Donald (2001a), I criticise
McFadden’s work on the grounds that, in as far as the Zeno effect (or “inverse Zeno
effect” to use McFadden’s language) is a physical effect, it can occur only in very
carefully established circumstances, precisely set up in order to achieve a given end.
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Suppose, in the notation of the example above, that ρ2 represents the outcome which
is to be chosen. Then, as I explain in Donald (2001a), the Zeno effect does provide
a dynamics formed using a sequence of carefully chosen projections, corresponding
to von Neumann’s quantum events, which, with probability one, will drive the total
state towards the state ρ2. That dynamics, however, is not the well-understood
biologically-evolved dynamics produced by the interactions of the ions and atoms and
molecules and electric fields of the human brain. It is a purely theoretical dynamics
which depends on working towards the desired outcome right from the start of the
initial quantum spreading. How and when the choice is supposed to result in the
construction and action of the projection operators still has to be explained. The
projections need to be defined to the precision of an individual wavefunction. Above
atomic scales, no biological mechanism can control or even repeat states at this level
of precision.
If we want to observe the quantum Zeno effect in the laboratory, then we need to
build an apparatus (e.g. Itano et al. 1990). Using von Neumann’s idea of “measure-
ment” as a chain of physical processes, it would seem that such a physical apparatus
will itself have a dynamics which can be understood in terms of the conventional laws
of physics described by the Schro¨dinger equation, and which can be used to explain
the observed effects. Models of this type are discussed in chapter 8 of Namiki, Pas-
cazio, and Nakazato (1997), in section 3.3.1 of Giulini et al. (1996), and in Gurvitz
(2002). According to this picture, Stapp needs to tell us what apparatus biology has
built into our brains which allows us to use the quantum Zeno effect to make choices.
Otherwise, he would seem to be supposing that brains are somehow physically special
and that, for some reason, they cannot themselves be analysed by external observers.
He would have invented a homunculus with access to a space of projection operators
defined on an atomic scale. How is that homunculus supposed to choose which pro-
jection he wants to employ next? How does he control individual wavefunctions or
the projections which correspond to them?
von Neumann’s abrupt changes seem to require the choice of a question; the
choice of what is to be measured. At the heart of Stapp’s work is the idea that
making that choice is what consciousness does. However, I believe that when we
make a choice we are doing mental work involving ordinary physical neural process-
ing; just as when we express a question in words we use the linguistic mechanisms
which are available in our brains as a result of the life we have led. In my opinion, de-
spite the interesting ideas of William James (Stapp 1993) and Harold Pashler (Stapp
2001a), neurophysiology is more fundamental than psychology. My basic objection
to Stapp’s work is that he does not appear to have made any connection between the
representation of choices by physical neural processing – or indeed any other cellular
process – and their representation as projection operators to be measured. Only for
an extra-physical homunculus, does the consideration of a choice not involve physical
operations. And however the choices are made, the ultimate purpose of choosing
must lie in the physical consequences of the choice; in other words in the change in
the global quantum state. Stapp has not explained how he supposes such changes are
limited. Why should they be restricted to changes within a brain? If mental forces
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can effectively decide the trajectories of atoms or molecules inside a brain, why can
they not decide the trajectories of electrons in a laboratory or of prey in the ocean?
What determined the point in evolutionary history when brains are supposed to have
started to be able to make choices? And finally, even if we do suppose that mind is
some sort of extra-physical homunculus, we have only managed to introduce a new
mystery. If there is a problem of free will, then it will still be there if we can ever get
to the point of analysing the operations of the homunculus.
As I see it, the central problem of the interpretation of quantum theory is to
explain and characterize the existence, or apparent existence, of “quantum events”,
or, in other words, of the process referred to as state “collapse”, or “wave-packet
reduction”, or “von Neumann’s process 1”. How is it, for example, that an electron,
despite going through a double slit as an extended wave, always appears to make a
well-localized impact on a screen at only one of many possible places, so that the
extended wave apparently “collapses” to a localized state? A characterization of
collapse should tell us what possibilities arise – this is “the preferred basis problem”.
The characterization should be well-defined and unambiguous. It should be explained
how one collapse leads on to the next and the probability of a given collapse should
also be well-defined. With such a theory, it will no longer be possible to invoke the
quantum Zeno effect as a clever trick by which arbitrary sequences of collapses can
be used to attain any desired outcome. Instead, there will be specific circumstances
in which the effect, or the appearance of the effect, will arise as a consequence of the
specific collapses which actually occur, or which appear to occur.
Just as one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind is
whether mental events are merely how neurophysiological events appear, so one of
the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of quantum theory is whether von
Neumann’s indeterministic events are merely how the continuous changes appear in
specific circumstances. My starting point is to answer both questions affirmatively,
and therefore I have tried to develop a theory characterizing “appearance”. Stapp
certainly answers the second negatively and therefore owes us an analysis of quantum
events. He is ambiguous about the first. In Stapp (1993 §7.5), he claims that there
is, “An isomorphic connection [ ] between the structural forms of conscious thoughts,
as described by psychologists, and corresponding actualized structural forms in the
neurological patterns of brain activity, as suggested by brain scientists.” On the other
hand, on the same page, he claims to have provided for, “A mechanical explanation of
the efficacy of conscious thoughts”. I have no idea to what this is supposed to refer.
In Stapp (1993 §1.10), Stapp states that his theory “makes consciousness causally
effective, yet it is fully compatible with all known laws of physics, including the law of
conservation of energy.” Stapp does not justify this statement. In general, energy is
not conserved in individual quantum jumps. Average total energy may be conserved
if the projections involved commute with the global Hamiltonian. Leaving aside
the commutation question, however, this would require that “causal effectiveness”
produces the same averages as conventional quantum probabilities. In Stapp (1995),
Stapp admits that, “No attempt is made here to show that the quantum statistical
laws will hold for the aspects of the brain’s internal dynamics controlled by conscious
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thoughts”. While it may be appropriate, as he suggests in the same paper, to make
an assumption of ignorance about the external causes of external events, it would be
absurd to suppose that conscious thoughts can be efficacious but without external
consequences. The suggestion mentioned above that the initial state of the universe
might be a vacuum state is certainly not compatible with the idea that energy is
conserved (or appears to be conserved) in individual quantum events (or observed
events).
Stapp suggests that state collapse is driven by conscious choice, but does not
explain what conscious choice involves. Ulrich Mohrhoff (2001) criticizes Stapp’s
work and is replied to by Stapp (2001b). In my opinion, Mohrhoff’s proposals are
at least as weak as Stapp’s. Mohrhoff agrees with Stapp that, “the choice of which
question will be put to nature . . . is not governed by the physical laws of contemporary
physics”, but he bases his analysis of quantum events on the idea of the existence of
definite “facts” and he explicitly denies that “facts” can be characterized.
In my own work, I have attempted to give an abstract characterization of “facts”.
Thus, instead of trying to define a particular set of projection operators giving rise
to the observed collapses, I have defined an abstract pattern of projection operators
which is capable of expressing the observed information. Such a pattern can be
constituted by many possible sets of projections, and the entire set of these sets for
a given pattern is central to the definitions I provide. By working at a high level of
abstraction in this way, it is possible to avoid much arbitrariness in the definitions. I
propose that each of us exists as an individual developing pattern of information. The
development is stochastic, with probabilities defined by quantum mechanical laws.
According to these laws, the experience of each individual observer is the experience
of observing a particular, identified, discrete stochastic process.
While I work at a high level of abstraction, I work with simple elements. In
other words, I have built up patterns of information using projections considered as
yes-no questions. This is speculation. It is just a hypothesis that information in the
brain is constituted as a pattern of yes-no questions. Making a specific hypothesis,
however, does allow specific technical questions to be addressed and allows a theory
to be developed and its defects to be revealed.
My theory is a many-minds theory. This means that each of us has our own pat-
tern of observed “quantum events”. Consistency between mutually-aware observers
is a consequence of the nature of quantum probability. My theory is dualistic in the
sense that there are physical laws and there are observers, but there are no mental
computations without observable physical structure. My theory is epiphenomenalistic
in the sense that a mind does not direct a pattern of observed physical events, rather
it has to make sense of such a pattern as it unfolds. Ultimately, however, my the-
ory should probably be considered as idealistic because, in its final form, the central
structures in the theory are mental structures. Physics just supplies the probabilities
by which those mental structures change. Mental structures give meaning to their
realities by understanding themselves in terms of observable physical structures and
observed physical events. I propose that, with an appropriate definition of mental
structure, the nature of quantum probability will make it likely that if awareness is
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attained, it will understand itself in such terms. The centrality of mind allows the
often-asked question of how an epiphenomenal consciousness could have evolved, to
be side-stepped. Instead, I suggest that we should look for the most likely way in
which a structure sufficiently complex to be self-aware could appear to have arisen
under simple natural laws.
Relativity is another major issue which has led Henry Stapp and I to take very
different paths. With the extension to relativistic quantum field theory, the continuous
deterministic unitary change at the heart of quantum theory does become manifestly
compatible with the theory of special relativity. Abrupt events however are much
more problematic. Special relativity requires that no change can be communicated at
a speed faster than that of light. Yet von Neumann’s abrupt events apparently happen
instantaneously across the entire universe. Moreover, there seems to be considerable
empirical evidence for instantaneous non-local changes in a rather peculiar form of
correlation information about what might happen under various independent choices.
Stapp has generated much debate (e.g. Unruh 1997, Mermin 1997) by arguing that
quantum mechanics is therefore non-local (Stapp 1993 chapter 1, 1997, 2000c, 2002).
Interesting as the subleties of this debate may be, the most direct way to resolve
the problem that it addresses is to assume that the symmetry of special relativity
is broken by some objective sequence of hypersurfaces of simultaneity. This is the
assumption that Stapp (1993 §4.5.13, 1997, 2001a) makes.
Citing Tomonaga (1946) and Schwinger (1951), Stapp (2001a) claims that this
assumption “does not disrupt the covariance properties of the empirical predictions
of the theory” [his italics]. The precise relevance of these old papers, the technical
validity of which has been called into question by Torre and Varadarajan (1998), is not
entirely clear to me. The arguments of Tomonaga and Schwinger are concerned with
generalizing the Schro¨dinger equation to allow for arbitrary spacelike hypersurfaces,
rather than with an analysis of individual quantum events. A more modern approach
to relativistic quantum field theory uses the language of local algebraic quantum field
theory (Haag 1992). According to this theory, empirical predictions made in two
spacelike-separated regions Λ1 and Λ2 can be expressed by commuting projection
operators P1 and P2. Then, if ρ is the initial quantum state, the probability of the
result corresponding to P1 being seen in Λ1 and the result P2 being seen in Λ2 is given
by ρ(P1P2) in the notation used by mathematicians. (Physicists would think of ρ as
a density matrix and would write tr(ρP1P2).)
In this context, following the observation in Λ1, von Neumann’s abrupt event
would correspond to the replacement of ρ by ρ1 = P1ρP1/ρ(P1) and then, if the
observation in Λ2 is considered to be subsequent, ρ1 would be replaced by ρ12 =
P2ρ1P2/ρ1(P2) = P2P1ρP1P2/ρ(P1P2). As P1 and P2 commute, this is symmetric
under interchange of 1 and 2, and so, consistent with Stapp’s claim, does not depend
on the ordering of spacelike separated events.
Apart from the question, raised above, of whether the probabilities of events in
Stapp’s theory are equal to the conventional quantum probabilities given by state
expectation values, there are two problems with Stapp’s reliance on this argument.
The first is with the assumption that all quantum events can be divided into classes
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associated with some foliation of spacetime into spacelike hypersurfaces. In relativistic
quantum field theory, events are associated with spacetime regions rather than with
spacetime points. If there are too many events too close together, then there may
be no simple way of ordering the corresponding regions. This is why, in my work
(Donald 1995), I use the full causal structure of the relations between spacetime sets
in which events occur.
The second problem is with the identification of the “initial quantum state” –
the state ρ.
Suppose that I try to model my observations of some particular local macroscopic
system by associating a quantum state σ1 with that system. σ1 will depend on my
observations and my knowledge of the system. This means that σ1 will already be a
“collapsed” state, like ρ1, rather than “uncollapsed”, like ρ. Indeed, the only truly
“uncollapsed” state would be the actual initial state of the universe, which is the
state Everett refers to as the universal wavefunction. P2P1ρP1P2/ρ(P1P2) may be
symmetric under interchange of 1 and 2, but it does still depend on P1. If Stapp’s
suggestions are correct, σ1 will depend on the time in the universal clock defined by
Stapp’s objective sequence of hypersurfaces of simultaneity and on non-local events
at arbitrary distances; involving perhaps, conscious observers in other galaxies.
Without a complete theory describing the nature of quantum events, it is diffi-
cult to decide on the significance of this dependence of local observed states on the
supposed external events. Relativistic quantum field suggests that correlations be-
tween distant events are ever-present (Clifton and Halvorson 2000). Many of these
correlations may be individually negligible, but if instantaneous action at a distance is
allowed, then, at any moment, the effect of infinitely many distant events may need to
be taken into account. In particular, this might make it surprising that the passage of
time on Stapp’s universal clock, if it existed, should not have been observed through
some sort of frame-dependent effect on system dynamics.
An alternative way of looking at this issue would be to suppose that in some
region Λ1 (the “external” region) there is a range of possible results, corresponding to
projections (Pn
1
)N
n=1
. As long as
∑N
n=1
Pn
1
= 1, result Pn
1
will have probability ρ(Pn
1
)
in a global state ρ, and the expected state in a spacelike-separated region Λ2 will be∑N
n=1
ρ(Pn
1
)Pn
1
ρPn
1
/ρ(Pn
1
) =
∑N
n=1
Pn
1
ρPn
1
. As Pn
1
commutes with every operator
local to Λ2, this expected state is equal to ρ on Λ2. This indicates that external events
have no average effect in Λ2. However, going from this argument to the conclusion
that even infinitely many individual choices of projections like Pn
1
acting on the state
ρ will have no observable effect within Λ2 seems rather like imagining that it would
help a seasick man to be told that the average height of the sea is constant.
It is not straightforward to reconcile the apparent empirical evidence for instanta-
neous non-local changes in correlation information with the apparent evidence for the
Lorentz invariance of physical processes. My own approach takes as fundamental the
information possessed by individual localized observers. Each observer assigns, to any
system, the expected quantum state given the information s/he currently possesses.
In general, these states are not compatible. Although Alice may know that her distant
colleague Bob will have performed an experiment and will have found a result, she can
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only assign to the system which he is observing a state which expresses her ignorance
until such time as she learns what experiment he chose to perform and what results he
found. This has suggested to many (e.g. Wolfe 1936, Wigner 1961, Peierls 1991, Fuchs
2002) that quantum states are merely states of knowledge. Unfortunately, such a po-
sition becomes problematic when we try to understand psycho-physical parallelism
(Donald 2002).
Quantum states seem to play two roles; on the one hand describing how things
are, and on the other describing what we know about how things are and about how
they might be. Alice and Bob assign different states to each other in ways which
suggest that, for Alice, Bob’s existence has to be as indefinite as her knowledge of
his observations. This provides a primary motivation for a many-minds approach.
If individual local observers are considered separately, then we can suppose that for
Alice, all of Bob’s possibilities will continue to exist until she is in a position to see
his results for herself. By this means, the problem of compatibility between special
relativity and quantum theory can be reduced from dealing with events which are
supposed to occur instantaneously across the entire universe, to dealing with events
which occur within the structure of individual observers (cf. Tipler 2000, Timpson and
Brown 2002). Of course, no single observer should be singled out. If Alice believes
that all of Bob’s alternative possibilities continued to exist after the instant of Bob’s
observation, then she should also be prepared to allow that all of her own alternative
possibilities will also have continued to exist.
Stapp has always rejected many-worlds interpretations. He claims that such
interpretations have many technical problems to overcome (Stapp 1993, §1.13). In
Stapp (2001c), for example, he reviews some of the well-known problems with the
simplistic idea of a many-worlds theory which depends on a specific preferred or-
thonormal basis. It was precisely in order to avoid the kind of problem which he
discusses in that paper that I developed a theory in terms of abstract patterns of
information expressed not by a precise choice of wavefunction basis, but by ranges of
properties of density matrices (Donald 1986, 1990).
Stapp also raises metaphysical problems with many-worlds interpretations; in
particular problems concerning the nature of probabilities. For example, in Stapp
(1999) he writes, “In the evolving wave function of Everett the various branches do
evolve independently, and hence might naturally be imagined to have different ‘minds’
associated with them, as Everett suggests. But these branches, and the minds that
are imagined to be properties of these branches, are all simultaneously present. Hence
there is no way to give meaning to the notion that one mind is far more likely to be
present at some finite time than the others.”.
This is a much discussed problem (Loewer 1996, Vaidman 1996, Saunders 1998).
My response is to emphasize the primacy of the experience of probability. Life is
a game of chance. If we can give any meaning to probability at all, then we can
give meaning to the notion that we are far more likely to observe one possible future
event than another. In other words, if, as Stapp and I both propose, we accept that
consciousness is a significant aspect of reality, then we should be prepared to examine
the idea of “simultaneous presence”. Although, of course, there is a sense in which
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other branches are present, only my current branch is present to me. Probability is
something which, according to my theory, is experienced in individual branches. The
experience of an individual branch is genuinely unpredictable.
I would similarly emphasize the importance of the experience of free will. Schwar-
tz and Begley (2002) suggest that free will is incompatible with determinism, but whe-
ther all your actions have already been forseen by some omniscient deity, or whether
your brain is abuzz with quantum jumpings has no relevance to your apparent ability
to decide whether to call heads or tails when a coin is tossed. Until you call, you
know you are free to change your mind.
In my opinion, the lesson of Zeno’s original classical paradoxes is that it is a mis-
take to attempt to use metaphysics to foreclose options in theoretical physics. Stapp
and I agree that normal neural functioning provides a stream of quantum events. In
my view, the die roll for each of us as each of our quantum events occurs. My pri-
mary goal has been to understand the technical problems of how to define such events
(Donald 1990) and patterns of them (Donald 1995), and of how to define probabilities
for these events in a way compatible with the mathematics of quantum theory and the
assumption that our observations are typical (Donald 1986, 1992, 1999). If that task
has been successfully completed, then it is time to turn metaphysician and investigate
what might be implied about the nature of reality. Of course, the implications may be
strange or even disturbing, and may give us reason to prefer an alternative theory if
we have one, but I do not believe that metaphysics by itself can provide a convincing
refutation. Refutation, for the sort of theory I am proposing, would, I believe, require
flaws in the technical details, as discussed in section 1 of Donald (1999), or empirical
evidence that quantum theory does not apply at the macroscopic level. There may be
many other reasons, such as the speculative nature of the theory and its complexity, to
prefer an alternative theory, but it is hard to know how seriously these reasons should
be taken if the alternative has not reached a similar level of development. It is pre-
cisely because of the importance and difficulty of constructing a complete theoretical
structure that it is so disappointing that Stapp fails to provide more than sketches of
his ideas about the mathematical structure of thought (Stapp 1993 Appendix), about
selection of top-level codes (Stapp 1982) and selection processes (Stapp 1995), about
the role of the electromagnetic field (Stapp 1999), and about the quantum Zeno effect
(Stapp 1999, 2000a, 2001a).
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